The Diverse Faces of the UAE in the Syrian War
Written by Mohammad Yusuf
As the revolution in Syria reaches nearly a decade, the UAE has shown various shifts in its policies throughout the war.
Known for being one of the USA’s closest middle-eastern allies one may ask — what has the UAE been doing in the Syrian revolution? Who have they been supporting and/or opposing? And what effects has their intervention brought to the arena?
The ‘early days’ of the revolution
Prior to the 2011 Syrian uprising many Gulf monarchies, including the UAE, enjoyed relatively positive relations with Damascus. The UAE as well as Saudi Arabia (KSA) and other Gulf countries were worried about the regional uprisings otherwise known as the Arab Spring. These Gulf States wished to solve the issue with Syria in a peaceful manner, i.e. not ousting Assad from power.
However, in August 2011 ‘after the Saudi King called Assad a “killing machine” and demanded a stop to the bloodshed, the UAE joined its Arab counterparts in condemnation of Assad.’ Along with the five other members of the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council), Later on in the year, the UAE had started welcoming the activities of Syrian businessmen residing in the UAE who were opposed to the Damascus regime. The UAE eventually closed its embassy in March 2012, declaring support for the ‘legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people to restore security and stability to the country.’
In February 2012, the UAE became a member of the international coalition of states opposed to the Damascus regime known as the ‘Friends of Syria’. In late (October) 2013, the UAE was one of the ‘London 11’ states which met the opposition’s Syrian National Coalition (SNC) in the British capital. In July 2013 — it backed the newly-elected president of the SNC, Ahmad Jarba, a tribal leader from the Shammar clan in the north-eastern Syrian province of Hasakah, popular for its close ties with KSA.
The UAE never completely abandoned its traditional positions: preventing radical change by supporting authoritarian regimes; opposing democratization; and fighting against Islamic fundamentalist and so-called ‘jihadist groups’.
Between the years 2012 -2018 the UAE supported various opposition groups (most notably in southern Syria) who were anti Muslim-brotherhood and ‘anti-jihadi’ and their programmes were run by the CIA through the Military Operations Center (MOC) in Jordan.
In November 2012, the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry organized a ‘Partnership to Invest in Future Syria’ Conference under the patronage of the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with the participation of numerous UAE based Syrian businessmen in order to discuss and create opportunities for building the Syrian economy after the ousting of Assad.
Double standards or coming out of the closet?
It maybe surprising to many, regarding Syria, that the UAE never entirely cut diplomatic relations with Damascus and the Syrian embassy continued to operate in Abu Dhabi. Moreover, the Emirates opened its doors to a number of Assad’s close relatives, including his mother, Anisa (who died in the UAE in 2016), and his sister Bushra along with her children.
Furthermore, several pro-regime businessmen, who are internationally sanctioned, have also continued to do business through companies in the UAE with relative freedom, including Bashar Al-Assad’s first cousin, Rami Makhlouf, and Samer Foz. Many other Emirati businessmen known to be close to the UAE government also maintained relations with Damascus long after the eruption of Syria’s protest movement and some even established new companies in Syria and/or opened branches of their UAE based companies across the country with many UAE based individuals and companies actively aided Assad’s war effort.
According to a 2013 statement from the US Department of Commerce, Computerlinks FZCO, a distribution company in Dubai, agreed to pay a 2.8 million USD civil penalty for shipping equipment used to monitor and control internet traffic, which was under US embargo, to the Syrian government.
In July 2014, Pangates International Corporation was sanctioned for supplying the Syrian government and Sytrol, a state-owned oil company, with a large amount of specialty petroleum products between 2012 and 2014, used to operate its war machine.
The Dubai-based Yona Star acted as a shipping agent for the Syrian Air Force (SAF), Syrian Air Force Intelligence (SAFI), the Army Supply Bureau (ASB) and the Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC), all of which are known for developing the regime’s biological and chemical weapon capabilities.
Finally, throughout the years of conflict, the UAE maintained a high level of ‘humanitarian assistance’ to Syria through UN agencies based in Damascus working in close coordination with the Syrian government.
According to the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and UAE AID, foreign assistance to Syria reached 3.59 billion Emirati Dirham (AED) the equivalent of 977 million USD between 2012 and the beginning of 2019.
In comparison, the Emirates’ financial assistance to the opposition affiliated Syria Reconstruction Trust Fund had amounted to just 23 million USD as of February 2019.
Gradual Withdrawal from the Syrian Arena
The shift in the UAE’s foreign policy is due to the roots of the regional developments that conflict with its traditional interests especially in 2014–15; e.g. the war in Libya where it re-intervened against ‘Islamist-led’ groups supported by Turkey and Qatar wherein UAE led bombing caused high civilian casualties.
In June 2017 the UAE and KSA were the spearheads in leading the severing of ties with Qatar accusing it of ‘supporting terrorism’ and having ‘close ties to Iran’, all of which Qatar denied. This was sought to curb Qatar’s foreign policy and to subordinate it to their own regional agendas.
According to ‘the National’ agency, from the perspective of the UAE rulers, one of the main points of contention has been Turkey’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood and other ‘Islamic fundamentalist movements’ which they view as a threat to themselves and their interests. This led to numerous visits by many Emirati businessmen and their associates to Syria and in January of 2019 a Syrian government delegation was sent to the UAE.
After the Moscow led military-intervention in Syria and the likelihood of the Assad regime falling grew slim, the UAE started to soften its positions towards Assad. UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash expressed cautious support for Russia’s military intervention on Assad’s behalf.
It went further by playing a role in freezing the military fronts in Daraa and Quneitra governorates and threatening to cease funding the Southern Front on several occasions in 2017 and 2018. Finally, through Khalid al-Mahamid, it pushed the armed opposition groups to negotiate a Russian-brokered ‘local reconciliation agreement’ with the Syrian regime, which resulted in the rebels surrendering in July 2018 and resulting in the displacement of thousands of Syrians to the borders of Turkey.
By December 2018, the UAE had reopened its embassy in Damascus with Gargash tweeting that ‘an Arab role in Syria has become even more necessary to face the regional expansionism of Iran and Turkey.’
Between 28 August and 9 September of 2019 — an Emirati delegation attended the 61st session of the Damascus International Fair and stated that the presence of the UAE delegation at the event projected a deep desire to push forward economic relations between the two. Some Emirati entrepreneurs and economic actors noted the reconstruction of Syria represented a great opportunity for companies across the region, which included the Emirates.
In December 2019, in a video circulated by Russian state media outlet RT, the UAE’s charge d’affaires in Syria, Abdul-Hakim Naimi, praised the ‘wise leadership’ of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and hailed the Syria-UAE relationship as ‘solid, distinct, and strong.’
In late March 2020, the first publicized phone call made by an Arab leader was made to Bashar al-Assad marking the first of its kind since 2011. The Syrian SANA news said that UAE president Mohammad bin Zayed had stressed that Syria would not be alone at these critical circumstances, in response Bashar ‘praised the humanitarian position of the UAE and welcomed his (Zayed’s) cooperation.’ The phone call was made to discuss matters of the outbreak of Covid-19 throughout the region and ‘rising above political issues during this common challenge that we are all facing.’
Alignment with Russian Interests
At this stage the UAE shared common grounds with the Russians, which was to keep Assad in power and to counter the influence of Turkey. While the UAE expressed concern in September of 2018 about a potential Russia-led military escalation in Idlib, it has not publicly disagreed with Moscow’s description of the city as a ‘hotbed of terrorism’, and has confined its critiques of counter-terrorism operations in Idlib to ‘humanitarian concerns.’
Abu Dhabi’s opposition to Islamist movements in Syria, solidarity with the Syrian Kurds against Turkey, and desire to invest in Syria’s reconstruction all align neatly with Moscow’s objectives. This also led to having common grounds in the Libyan conflict where both countries (Russia and UAE) backed the Haftar militias against the UN recognized Libyan government, which is supported by Turkey.
Since then the UAE has been prioritizing the wars in Libya and Yemen as well as regional tensions with Qatar and Iran. In order to curb the influence of Iran in Yemen (through the Houthis) the UAE bombing campaigns, rather than ceasing Iranian influence, led to the death and destruction of hundreds of thousands of Muslim lives.
In Yemen, the UAE pushed for offensives to break the negotiations between the Saudi-led Islah party, well known to be linked to the Muslim brotherhood, and the Houthis in order to curb the ambitions of the latter. Even though being allies, yet competitors in Yemen, if it were not for the personal relationship between the leaders of the two countries the coalition between them would be at the brink of collapsing due to conflicting interests on the Islah party.
In the summer of 2020 several Gulf countries, including the UAE, were the first in line to normalize relations with Israel and the deal itself gave indications that the UAE had other agendas in mind than just solving the issues with Palestinians and the Jews.
The UAE has recently purchased billions of dollars worth of military equipment, including 50 of the latest F-35 fifth generation stealth fighter jets. It remains to be seen whether these would be used to deter the growing influence of Iran in the Middle-east and/or be used for more bombings in Muslim populated countries as in Libya.
‘Humanitarian’ and Leader of War?
The UAE portrays itself as the ‘leading humanitarian provider’ in the Middle East, housing the International Humanitarian City (IHC), which hosts nine UN agencies and more than 85 NGOs and provides aid to numerous conflict areas across the world. Thus, by focusing specifically on the coronavirus during Zayed’s call with Assad, the UAE can proceed to a dual-strategy of improving relations with the Syrian government while showcasing its commitment to global humanitarian work.
By relying on humanitarian justifications, the UAE can also pursue its independent foreign policy goals and divert any potential opposition from allies such as the USA. During the year 2020, the UAE has sent several shipments of ‘humanitarian aid’ to the Assad regime despite the US warning them against any dealings with the regime.
In March of 2020, days before a ceasefire deal was struck in a meeting in the Kremlin on the 5th, the crown prince sent Ali al-Shamsi, brother of the national security adviser and deputy of UAE armed forces commander Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ), who visited Damascus to negotiate a deal with Assad.
According to sources familiar with the prince’s plan, he agreed to pay Assad 3 billion USD to reignite the offensive against Idlib, the rebels’ last stronghold, 1 billion USD of which was due to be paid before the end of March.
From the agreed amount, 250 million USD had already been paid, up front, by the time the ceasefire was announced. It did not go according to plan after the Russian side apparently intervened and stopped the plan’s progress.
Various reports suggest that the Russian led military campaign on Idlib in 2019–20, which led to a humanitarian catastrophe (killing and displacing thousands of Syrians from their homes), was funded and supported by the UAE.
In conclusion
The UAE has had various positions during the Syrian revolution starting from being ‘friends of the revolution’ to the reality of being one of the prime supporters of the Assad regime. Its influence on the opposition brought nothing but ruin to them, resulting in the ones who ‘reconciled’ being forcefully thrown into the line of fire as test subjects during the military campaign in 2019–20.
For the Syrian people (in addition to Muslims in Libya and Yemen), the UAE has funded their enemies, contributed to the displacement of millions and killed thousands upon thousands. Its motivation to fulfil its agendas has led it to be the backbone of the Assad regime and his allies, thus, being poised to become one of the biggest supporters against the Muslims not only in Syria but worldwide.
References:
[1] Gulf News, “UAE Reaffirms Support for Syria,” 25 September 2013, https://bit.ly/2LM0I36
[2] The Arab Gulf States ins. Washington, “UAE and Russia find common ground in Syria” https://bit.ly/35Bxhuh
[3] Gov UK, “‘London 11’ Meeting on Syria,” Press release, 22 October 2013, https://bit.ly/2lKPDos
[4] Dubai Chamber, “Dubai Chamber Organizes the ‘Partnership to Invest in Future Syria’ Conference,” 30 October 2012, https://bit.ly/2kEN32V
[5] Dubai Chamber, “Partnership to Invest in Future Syria Held in Dubai,” 22 November 2012, https://bit.ly/2lKbJY3
[6] United States Department of Commerce, “Order Relating to Aiman Ammar, Rashid Albuni, Engineering Construction & Contracting Co., Advanced Tech Solutions and iT Wave FZCO,” 2013, https://bit.ly/2z7zn47
[7] Caline Malek, “US Sanctions Sharjah Company for Sales to Syria,” The National, 15 July 2014, https://bit.ly/2nNNitK
[8] US Department of Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Networks Providing Support to the Government of Syria,” 21 July 2016, https://bit.ly/29YCwrk
[9] Reinoud Leeders and Khouloud Mansour, “Humanitarianism, State Sovereignty and Authoritarian Regime Maintenance in the Syrian War,” Political Science Quarterly 133(2), July 2018, 225–257.
[10] Emirates News Agency, “UAE Aid to Syria Reaches AED3.59 billion from 2012–2019,” 25 January 2019, https://bit.ly/2m96Iby
[11] Syria Recovery Trust Fund, 13 February 2019, https://bit.ly/2BrrdVs
[12] The National, 6 March 2019, https://bit.ly/2Hgkxgl
[13] Asia Times, “UAE Using Soft Power in Syria After 7-Year Frost,” 31 May 2019, https://bit.ly/31S51Pl
[14] Hiba Mohammad, “Syrian Opponents to ‘Al-Quds al-Arabi’” (in Arabic), Al-Quds, 25 May 2018, https://bit.ly/2pXODiJ;
[15] Abdullah al-Jabassini, “From Rebel Rule to a Post-Capitulation Era in Daraa Southern Syria: The Impacts and Outcomes of Rebel Behaviour During Negotiations,” Research Project Report (Florence: European University Institute, February 2019), https://bit.ly/2nnQ0q4
[16] Private Sector — Damascus International Fair 61 (in Arabic), Facebook, 28 August 2019, https://bit.ly/2Lb02mb
[17] Ziad Awad, “Why 2019 and 2020 will be Great Vintage Years for Investing in the UAE and KSA,” Entrepreneur, August 2019, https://bit.ly/2lTeB5e
[18] Middle East Institute , Foreign policy and commercial interests drive closer UAE-Syria ties; Samuel Ramani; https://bit.ly/35D3NMT
[19] Middle East Eye; EXCLUSIVE: Mohammed bin Zayed pushed Assad to break Idlib ceasefire; Ragip Soylu. https://bit.ly/3lFu6aC
[20] The Guardian, Clashing UAE and Saudi interests are keeping the Yemen conflict alive, Bethan McKernan; https://bit.ly/3ntndty
